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•Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski on Contradiction
It was in 1911 that Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski met. Lesniewski
himself reported that at that time he had read Lukasiewicz's mas-
terpiece On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle (1910),1 and, as
Lejewski knew from Lukasiewicz, he said he had come to criticize
the author.ê In the same year Lesniewski wrote 11An Attempt at
a Proof of the Principle of Contradiction", which was published in
1912 on Przeglqd Filozoficzny and was addressed on the whole
against Lukasiewicz's book.3
Whereas the role played by the principle of contradiction in the
development of Lukasiewicz's ideas is generally speaking cor-
rectly underlined.s it is not so in Lesniewski's case. Surely the
oblivion which covered Lesniewski's early writings prevented the
scholars from regarding the issue worthy of inquiry in his philoso-
phy. Yet the controversy between Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz on
the principle. of contradiction may be considered quite rightly
a touchstone between their very distant philosophical attitudes,
which remained that way also later.
It is hard to exaggerate the great weight Lukasiewicz's mono-
graph had in the Polish logico-philosophical scene. Although po-
• Addedin proof. This paper was written in 1996. Until the publication in this issue
it has circulated in various versions and fonns. Although the bibliography has
been updated for the occasion, the paper has not been revised as regards con-
tent. Work on this artiele has been funded by NWO-grant n° 275-80-001.
1 o. LeSniewski [1927/31], p. 169 (Eng!. trans!. p. 181).
2 O. Lejewski [1995], p. 28.
3 Cf. Lesniewski [1912].
4 Cf. for instanee Woleftski [1990], p. 191; [1989], p. 119; [1987], p. XXXIV.
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lemically inspired, Lesniewski did acknowledge the importance of
Lukasiewicz's work:
<My> results [...] on the whole oppose the theoretical theses supported
by Lukasiewicz [...] But the polemical character <of some passages>
should not arouse in the reader the erroneous conviction that I turn
a blind eye to the theoretical value of Lukasiewicz' s work, which I re-
gard as one of the most interesting and originalof the entire 'philo-
sophical' literature known to me,"
Lukasiewicz's On the Principle of Contradiction
in Aristotle (1910)
Even if the appendix included in Lukasiewicz's monograph, "The
Principle of Contradiction and Symbolic Logic" - written to the
model of Louis Couturat's AIgèbre de la logique (1905) - was not the
first publication in formal logic in Poland.s it was surely the most
popular handbook among Polish philosophers. Perfectly appropri-
ate to the context of the book, the appendix was probably the best
contribution to Lukasiewicz's fundamental claim that the principle
of contradiction - in the form 1 ~ -,(0. /\ -,a.) - is by no means the
supreme principle of logic, being an ordinary theorem that in the
simplest case may he inferred from other 11 theoremsj? moreover,
it keeps on remaining true even denying the Postulate of Existence
of non-contradictory objects (1*0), although in this way it turns out
to be true also 1~ a /\ -,0..
To mark the distance between Aristotle's and his own positions,
Lukasiewicz presents a résumé, more or less like the following,"
Jl. There are three formulations of the Principle:
Ontological (OPC) No object may at the same time possess and not
possess the same property;
5 Lesniewski [1912], p. 202. Translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated. .
6 The first was Stanislaw Piatkiewicz's Algebra w logice (1888), cf. Batóg-Murawski
[1996].
7 O. Lukasiewicz [1910a], Dodatek, §9, pp. 185-196 (Germ. transl, pp. 231-245).
8 O. Lukasiewicz [1910a], pp. 135-142 (Germ. transl. pp. 165-173).
Logical (LPC) Two judgements of which the first aseribes to an ob-
ject exactly that property which the second denies to
it cannot be true at the same time;
Psychological (PPC) Two opinions to which correspond contradic-
tory judgements cannot exist in the same in-
tellect at the same time;
OPC, LPC, PPC are not synonymous formulations, because they
contain different concepts (objectjproperty, judgementjtruth,
opinionjtemporal co-existence), nevertheless, given that true
judgements (positive and negative) correspond to objective facts,
i. e. relations of possessing and not possessing of properties by an
object, OPC is equivalent to LPC; PPC cannot be an a priori certain
judgement, but at most an empiricallaw.
J2. PC in the formulation OPC or LPC requires a proof, since it is
not an ultimate principle. For 'ultimate principle' it is to be under-
stood a judgement not to he proved from other judgements, since
it is true by itself. The sole judgement true by itself is the definition
of true judgement.
J3. PC is not the supreme Iaw of logic, neither the necessary, nor
the sufficient condition for the other laws of logic. The proof is that
we can deductively and inductively infer without it.
J4. PC is different both from the Principle of Identity and from the
Principle of the Double Negation and it cannot he inferred from
any of them, neither from the definition of false judgement, nor
?,om the concept of negation. Applied to contradictory objects, PC
IS false, although the Principle of Identity and the Principle of
Double Negation are both true. It is not possible to prove PC nei-
ther referring to its immediate evidence (evidence is not a truth
criterion, since even false judgements may turn out to be evident;
hesides, PC is not evident to all people), nor to its psychological
necessity (which, fixed as it seems in our mental organization,
~orces us to admit PC); from the psychological point of view false
Judgements may he necessary, too; moreover, not everybody feels
the necessity to admit PC.
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JS. The only formal proof of PC is .based on the ?e~~ti:0n of object
as 'what does not possess contradIctory properties : it IS, however,
a fonnal proof and not a concrete proof.
J6. A concrete proof of PC wou1d require the ~roof that every~ing
that is an object in the first sense (it is something and ~ot not~g)
is an object in the second sense, too (it does not contam contradie-
tions); but such a proof cannot be carried out..I~deed, on one side
there are several contradictions among a priori mental construc-
tions (transfinite numbers, Russell's antinomy), on the othe~ side
there is not any guarantee that even apparently no~-contra.dlcto~y
constructions do not contain contradictory properhes; besides, m
reality it is possible that there is c~ntra~iction in the c~ntinuous
change which the entire real world IS subject to. If exp~rlen~ed~s
not demonstrate that contradiction, it does not deny it: neither m
this case is there any guarantee that apparently non-contradictory
things and phenomena do not contain contradictory properties.
J7. 5ince PC cannot be proved, notwithstan~ing~t requires a proof,
it is devoid of logical worth. At the same time it possesses an ex-
traordinary ethico-practical worth: it is the sole weapon we have
against errors and lies.
Lesniewski's "Attempt at a Proof of the Ontological
Principle of Contradiction" (1912) as published in
Logical Studies (1913)
As already dear from the title, Lesniewski pays attention exclu-
sively to the ontological version o.f PC, i. e. <?pc. Lesnie~ski op-
poses Lukasiewicz that ~PC re,urres. a proof .mdeed, b~t u may be
carried out, so that Of'C IS not devoid of lOgica! worth at all. The
philosophical heart of the controversy mostly eentres on JS, J6, J7,
that is the opposition Lukasiewicz draws between afonnal ~d
a concrete proof of apc; the daim that there are contradzctory ooject»
in formal constructions and maybe in reality, too; that apc cannot
beproved. .. . .
In actual fact, Lesntewski did not turn a bhnd eye to Luk~-
siewicz's work. On the contrary, his eye was wide-open: with his
typical maniacal analysis, he turned against Lukasiewicz many of
the latter's ideas and results, "entangling him in his own web" .9
The Attempt was re-handled and translated by Lesniewski him-
self to.geth~r with his .~st ~aper, /I A. Contribution to the Analysis
of Existential Propositions (1911) In the booklet Logical Studies
~1913), which contains a re-organization of the materials presented
In the two papers.!" The changes are very radical in the case of the
Contribution, slighter for the Attempt - apart from a different order
of the trea~ed issue~ and a decisive addition: the famous critique of
general objects, which appeared for the first time in Logical Studies,
and not in "The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded
Middle" (1913), where it was only repeated." 5ince Logical Studies
presents a better exposition of Lesniewski's ideas and it marks
a c~ucial step f~~ the development of Lesniewski's thought.P from
which he would not return, my analysis will be based on the first
part of the booklet corresponding to the Attempt (labelled hence-
forth Attempt2) more than on the Attempt itself (Attemptl), critique
against general objects included.P
Lesniewski's proof is preceded by some logical, semantic and
ontological premises. Thanks to them and to some conventions he
introduces, he concludes - through some synonymous formula-
tions - that OPC is true.
The main points of the A tiempï- may he outlined as follows:
SI. ~inguistic expressions mayor may not have symbolic function,
that IS t~e p:operty to symbolize or not an object. They can be also
connota~ve, 1. e. to connote s?me properties, or, equally, to signify
something, or n?t. Connotative expressions are those expressions
that can be defined per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.
Below are some examples given by Lesniewski himself:
9 The rich image is Koterbinski's (Kotarbiáski [1921], p. 105), who, nevertheless,
uses it for other purposes.
10 Cf. Lesniewski [1913c].
11 Cf. Lesniewski [1913b],pp. 317-20 (Eng!. transl, pp. 49-53).
12 Q. Betti [1998a]and [1998b].
13 Lesniewski [1913c].
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Expressions Connotative Non-connotativ;-
with symbolic 'man' -
function 'green' 'object'
,the possessing by every man of the
propertv of mortality'
without symbolic 'round square' -
function 'centaur' 'for'
I, h
I t e possessing by every man of the 'abracadabra
propertv of immortality'
In p~ticular, 'obj~ct' is a symbol of anything, and is non-
c~nnota~Ive bec~use It cannot be defined per genus proximum et
dijfrrer;tia.m ~p~cificam unless we fall into a regressus in infinitum,
smce object IS synonymous with 'being', and 'being' is summum
g:nus.. ~xpressions mayor may not have the property of symbolic
dlSposlti~n: an exp~ession which has this property only seems to
symbolize something, no matter whether it does or not. Sentences
ar~ those expressions that all have disposition of symbolizing relations
of lnherence: A sentence is true when it has symbolic function, it is
false when it has not; the symbolic function of a sentence depends
on the symbolic functions of the component terms. True sentences
of the form 'a is b' symbolize relations of inherence. The sentences
(1) 'Every man is mortal'
(2) ,A hippocentaur possesses the property of horseness'
are lin~uistic expressions with symbolic disposition, that is both
have disposition of symholizing a relation of inherence, i.e. the
possessing by every o~ject denoted by the subject of the properties
connoted by the predicate, but (1) has symbolic function, while (2)
has not.
82. The Ontological Principle of Contradiction is the sentence
OPC. We may substitute several synonymous formulations to
OPC. In order to see if any two sentences are or are not synonyms
~e need t? reduce them to the canonical form la is b'. The conven-
tion re-written as follows is an example of such a reduction:
(3) Any sentence of the form 'x is b~ X is é is synonymous with
the sentence'xb is é,
that is to say that a conditional sentence of the form 'x is b~ x is é
is synonymous with the sentence in canonical form 'x-with-the-
property/ ies-connoted-by-b is é .
53. From 82 it sterns that the sentence
(4) If x is an object, then x cannot have and not have at the same
time the property c
is not synonymou~ withOPC. The proof follows from applying (3)
to (4), ~here bIS. rep,resented by 'object'. Since 'object' is non-
connot~tlve,no object l~ d~noted by 'xb', i. e. is the object with the
properties connoted by object': for this reason (4) and OPC, whose
subject denotes anything, are not synonyms, The sentences
(5) Every A is B
(6) If something is A, then it is B
are not synonyms, too.
54. As philosophia prima, metaphysics - as Aristotle indicated - is the
system o~ all the true sentences ~bout a~l the objects in general.ë
Fro~ ~3 It follows that metaphysics can he built not as a system of
conditional sentences, but as a system of categorical sentences. How-
ever, metaphysics has nothing in common with sentences about
the so-ealled 'general objects' .. Conceptions about general objects
lead to ~on-obJectual speculations, and we might get rid of those
co~ceptlons once and for all by the following proof. Let a 'general
obJ,ect',~ anobj~ct which is general with respect to a certain group
of ~ndlvl~ual objects, Such an ~bject may possess only those prop-
~rtles ~hlCh ar,e common,to all the individual objects correspond-
Ing. to it, for instanee triangularity for the 'triangle in genera!'
which does not possess equilaterality, or isoscelesness, etc.
14 ~esniewski quotes the incipit of Aristotle's Metaphysics (D 1003, 21):
ÉO'ttV É7ttO'tilJ.lll ttç il GEropEt tÓ ÓV il ÓV Kai tá roûno u7táPxovta leaG amó" O.
Lesniewski [1913c], Remark N to §3, p. 139 n. 81.
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Proof.
(premise) A certain object Pk15 is a general object corresponding to
the individual objects P'i, P'2, P'3...P'«. ..
i. For every individual object Pik it is always possible to fmd
a property pk not common to the individual objects P'1, p l2, P'3...P'«
(1) The general object P» has not the property pv.
ii. The individual object PIk having the property pkdoes ~ot ~o~-
sess the property of not possessing the prope~ty pi: 0~elWlse, if lt
were non-possessing pIv it would he a contradictory obJe~, hecause
it would be an object possessing and at the same time non-
possessing the property pk.
iii. The property of not possessing the property pk is n~t ~o~-
mon to all the individual objects P'l, P'2, P'3...P'« smce the individ-
ual object PIk possesses the property pv. .
(Il)(For this reason) the general object .Pk ~~ not either the pr?p-
erty of not possessing the property pv, I. e. it IS not non-possessmg
the property Pk; that is, it pos~esses the property pv. .
From comparing (1) and (II) lt turns out that ~he p~enuse.leads to
a contradiction. Thus the sentence that a eertam object P» IS a gen-
eral object is false, that proves at the same time that no object is
a general object.
SS. Establishing linguistic conventions has nothing in common with
conventionalism: linguistic conventions are not indemonstrabIe
sentences about objects and properties over which one has no
power, but true sentences about states of affairs (stany rzeczy) cre-
ated by whoever establishes them.
56. OPC is a true principle and it can he proved. The proof is di-
vided in two parts:
1. Proof that every object is non-contradictory;
11. Proof that the sentence "Not every object is non-contradictory"
is apriori false.
Lesniewski versus Lukasiewicz
The real heart of Lesniewski's Attempt2 is the semantic analyses
presented and the theoretica! tension associated by Lesniewski
15 Corrected from 'object p" in Lesniewski [1913cl, Remark V to §3, p. 141. O. also
Lesniewski [1913b], Remark 11 to §1, p. 319 (Engl. transl. p. 50).
with OPC. Lesniewski requires that if a sentence'a is b' has to be
true, the subject a must have symbolic function (or must be not
empty or non-denotative or non-objectual);16 therefore the sentence
(7)A hippocentaur is a horse
is .false, because 'hippocentaur' is an empty name. In aremark
~hich advance~the conclusions of the Aitemptt, from this point of
VIew the most Important of the paper, Lesniewski proclaims his
disagreement with Lukasiewicz's statements, according to which
'hippocentaur'
denotes truly something of non-existing, but it is not <expression> devoid
ofmeaning
and 'the square built by rule and compasses and identical as re-
gards the surface area to the circle of a radius of l' denotes "an
object with contradictory properties". 17
Classical examples of contradictory objects are 'wooden irons' [...]
'square rounds' or 'round squares'. Some regard these funny combina-
tions of words as empty sounds, sounds devoid of meaning. As to me,
I deern that they are not simply empty sounds, like 'abracadabra' or 'mo-
hatra', but yet they mean something. In fact it is possible to predicate
about the round square that it is a round, that it is a square,
a contradictory object, etc., while it is not possible to predicate something
about 'abracadabra', because this word does not mean anything. [...] 'the
square built by rule and compasses and identical as regards the surface
area to the circle of a radius of l' [...] is therefore a contradictory object,
and yet it means something, is something, is an object.l8
Although also for Lesniewski the meaning of 'hippocentaur' and of
~object ~it~ contradict?ry properties' is perfectly determined (for
instanee hippocentaur connotes the property of humanity and the
property of horsenessj.t? neither 'something of non-existing' nor
16 Lesniewski [1913c], Remark 11 to §18, p. 132 =Lesniewski [1912], p. 220 (Engl.
transl, p. 40), with minor changes.
17 Lesniewski [1913c], Remark 11 to §4, p. 126 = Lesniewski [1912], p. 213 (Engl.
transl, p. 32), with minor changes; Lukasiewicz [1910a], pp. 65-66 (Genn. transl.
pp.80-91).
18 Cf, Lukasiewicz [1910a], pp. 60-61 (Genn. transl. 74-75).
19 Q. Lesniewski [1913c], Remark 11to §4, p. 126 = Lesruewski [1912], p. 213 (Engl.
transl, p. 32), with minor changes.
T30. 1 ~ -,(0. /\ -,a)
which is proved on the basis of definition of 'object' as 'something
which is non-contradictory' and is
20 Ibid.
21 a. Lesniewski [1913c], Remark to §8, p. 119 =Lesniewski [1912], p. 204 (Engl.
trans!. p. 22).
22 Lukasiewicz [1910a], p. 43 (Genn. transl, p. 52).
23 Ibid.
24 a. Lukasiewicz [1910a], Dodatek, p. 185 (Genn. trans!. p. 231).
'object with contradictory properties' denote any object, because
na object is 'something of non-existing', since
no object has any property of 'non-existence' connoted by that expression
<'something of non-existing'>.2o
I should also remark that Lesniewski's definition of synony-
mous sentences differs from Lukasiewicz's in sa far as the first
requires the subjects to be not only denoting the same objects, but
also connoting the same properties, so that the sentences
(8) Aristotle was the creator of logic
(9)The Stagirite was the creator of logic
are not synonyms in Lesniewski's view ('Aristotle' connotes the
property of having the name 'Aristotle', while 'Stagirite' does
not).21 Moreover, Lesniewski does not discuss the difference syn-
onymousness/ equivalence: all the transformations of sentences he
deals with are salva significatione, and synonymousness seems to be
the relation between sentences he wants to preserve in inferences.
The argument in 53. is addressed directly against Lukasiewicz:
Lukasiewicz asserts that Ol'C is synonymous with its conditional
formulation (4),22 since
every general judgement, positive or negative, presents a link between
two judgements: 'Every A is B' means in fact that 'if something is A, then
it is B' [...] There is not any doubt about the synonymousness of these
forms.ë
Lesniewski refutes the synonymousness of Of'C with (4) for the
non-connotativity of 'object'. On (4) Lukasiewicz founds the sole
formal proof of the Principle of Contradiction.ë (4) is indeed the
appendix's theorem
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25 Lukasiewicz [1910a], Dodatek, p. 195 (Germ. transl, pp. 244-245).
26 a. Lukasiewicz [1910a], Dodatek, p. 152 (Germ. transl. p. 186).
27 Cf. Kotarbinski [1967], p. 2.
28 a. Lukasiewicz [1910a], Chap. XVI, passim.
29 Koterbinski [1966], p. 158.
(10) If P is something and is not nothing, then P is a non-
contradictory object. 26
Lesniewski is not seeking for any concrete proof of Of'C beside the
formal one: on the contrary, to prove Of'C means to prove that
Ol'C is a true sentence in so far as accepted conventions and se-
mantic premises allow. WeIl, for Lukasiewicz the impossibility to
prove PC concretely (10) and not only formally (4) - where for
'concrete proof' is meant an answer to the question 'Are there
contradictory objects?' - was opening new and fruitful perspec-
tives to logic. We know actually that from this moment Luka-
siewicz was driven to theorize a non-bivalent system of logic
('non-chrysippean' he was to christen it later):27 reality does ~ot
prove nor deny PC, so if it is an ordinary theorem and not a prIn-
ciple and less than ever the supreme law of logic,28 as Lukasiewicz
tried to show, other logics are possible.
The disputation between Lesniewski and Lukasiewicz seems
from these first remarks to centre in its fundamental features on
pure ontology, if it is true that - according to Kotarbinski's 1966
definition - Lukasiewicz's appendix was a treatise of general theory
of objects.29 If the crucial element to be noticed appears to be
a purely ontological controversy between Lukasiewicz and
Lesniewski, that is the possibility - admitted by the first, denied by
the second - that in reality there are contradictory (and fictitious)
objects, the controversy ends up by regarding different ways of
understanding 'object'. In this respect there are several matters to
be considered from the historical point of view, that lay in the
like all the laws of symbolic logic, only a hypothetical theorem which es-
tablishes that if P is an object, then P cannot at the same time have and not
have c. But it does not follow from this that P is an object, i. e. is simply an
object and is not at the same time a non-object.ê"
To obtain a concrete proof of PC it would be necessary to prove not
(4)but
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30 Cf. Twardowski [1894],pp. 37-38 (Eng!. transl. p. 35).
31 O. Lukasiewicz [1910c].
32 Cf. Lukasiewicz [1910a], p. 112 ff. (Genn. transl, p. 137 ff.).
33 Cf. Lukasiewicz [1910a], p. 13, p. 28, p. 42, p. 110 and first of all pp. 112-113
(Genn. transl, pp. 13, 33, 41, 60 n. 1, 135 n. 1 and 137-138); cf. also Lukasiewicz
[1910bJ,pp. 17,35 (Eng!. trans!. pp. 488, 506-507).
34 Cf. for instanee Simons [1989], p. 251-252 and 4., pp. 256-258; cf. also Simons
[1993], p. 210. Lukasiewicz even quotes Meinong's 1908/09 academie leetures,
cf. Lukasiewicz [1910a], p. 112, n. (Germ. transl, p. 137 n. 1).
35 Cf. Comelius [1894]and Husserl [1896].
background of this discussion. One should not forget that Luka-
siewicz's position, according to which 'object' is that which is
something and not nothing - distinct from the object that is some-
thing but also exists, sa that there are objects which exist and ob-
jects which do not exist - recalls on one side immediately Twar-
dowski's ideas,30 on the other side has the very redundant ontol-
ogy of Meinong as background, with the distinction Sein-Sosein. It
is not a mystery that Meinong had a considerable influence on the
development of Lukasiewicz's logical ideas. It should be noticed
that - as regards the genesis of three-valued Iogic - Lukasiewicz
Iaunched his attack simultaneously against PC and the Principle of
the Excluded Middle.ê! in the latter case a non-marginal role was
played by meinongian incomplete objects,32 more than twardow-
skian general objects, to which - however - the former owed very
much. Lukasiewicz not only quotes several times Meinong's name
in the book and in the dense German abstract which he pub-
lished.ê- but immediately after having drawn up the work on Ar-
istotle he was as privatdozent in Graz, where at that time Meinong
was teaching.ê! Meinong's name appears for the first time in a note
Lesniewski added to the Atiempt-, where he cites the second edi-
tion of Meinong's Über Annahmen, but presumably Lesniewski
knew Meinong's ideas much before, for one of his teachers, Hans
Cornelius, had discussed them in his Versuch einer Theorie der Exis-
tentialurteile (1894).35 WeIl, one could hardly conceive of a more
distant position from Meinong's ideas than Lesniewski's. That no
object is a contradictory object is a metaphysical claim - which se-
mantically expresses itself as: there are emptynames - that one meets
in all the works by Lesniewski, and 'to be something' and 'to be
a non-contradictory object' appear for the latter to he one and the
same thing, besides the 'square circle' is not a non-existing object:
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it is not an object at all. In Lesniewski, contrary to what Meinong
was thinking, the totality of objects coincides with the totality of what is
realor existing, hence to be an object, to he existing, to be some-
thing, to be an individual object, to be real, to have defined spatio-
temporal dimensions are in the final analysis the same thing. In
this perspective it has no sense to ask for a concrete proof of PC as
distinct from a formal one, as Lukasiewicz did. Moreover, it was
not by chance that Lesniewski included his critique against general
objects in the Atiemptï (see 54). The nearest target of the critique
was Twardowski, guilty for having enriched his ontology of such
unlikely objects.ë If one thinks that in Twardowski general objects
are nothing but special cases of contradictory objects, characterized
both of them by the fact that they may be presented non-intuitively
and indirectIy and, furthermore, by their non-existence.F the cri-
tique finds its natural place in the Attemptè. Besides, the key pas-
sage in Lesniewski's proof is 54. ii., in which Lesniewski shows
that in order to build a general object from individual objects one
should violate OPC, and since the latter is true, that construction is
impossible. For this reason Lesniewski was not considering gen-
eralobjects to be objects violating the ontological tertium non datur.
Undoubtedly it is true that - as Küng wrote - Lesniewski's argu-
ment is applicable only to concrete objects, since an abstract object
(a class, a universal idea) [...] cannot he defined as an object which
possesses the properties of the concrete individuals subsumed
under it, because an object must possess properties that are not
assignabIe to any of the individual at issue".38 Anyway, on one
hand 'to be constructable from individual objects' seems to be
Lesniewski's requirement for an object to be admitted in his uni-
verse, on the other hand Lesniewski's aim, as a matter of fact, is
precisely to exclude general objects from reality, just as there are
not contradictory objects in the constructions of thought, of which
- as to Lukasiewicz - Russell's antinomy was a sample. But, ac-
cording to Lesniewski, since there is only one ontologicallevel and
only one existence (spatio-temporal), to exclude something from
36 "The field on which <Twardowski> opposed Bolzano [...]<is> that eminently
ontological of the object, on which Bolzano had been much more careful than
Twardowski was at that time, or, even worse, than it was to heMeinong shortly
afterwards", Casari [2000],§1.
37 Cf. Smith [1989],p. 329.
38 Cf. Küng [1967],p. 103.
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39 Lukasiewicz [1910a], p. 89,my emphases (Germ. transl. p. 110).
40 Wolenski [1987], pp. XXII-lIl. See also Meinong: lilt may sound strange to hear
that metaphysics is not universa! enough for a science of Objects [...] With~ut
doubt, metaphysics has to do with everything that exists. However, the totall~
of what exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small In
comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge [...], cf. Meinong
[1904], p. 486 (Eng!. trans!. p. 79).
reality is to deny it tout court, for there is not any other world or
realm where this something could beo It iseasy to see how much
Lukasiewicz does not agree with these ideas:
Logical and ontological principles are not only surer, but also more
general than metaphysical principles; in fact they regard equally
metaphysical beings, constituting the essence of the world (istot~) as the
objects of experience and creations of human intellect which do not really
exist, in general everything that is something and not nothing. If
Aristotle's principle of contradiction is only a metaphysical law, then it
would not be improbable as of now the assertion that its logical and
ontological meaning is not great. 39
The distinction Lukasiewicz draws between ontology and meta-
physics, which seems to be a difference between "possible struc-
tures of beings [...] and the research on ontology as realized in 'our
world'" ,40 is clearly rejected by Lesniewski. Lesniewski accepts the
distinction between logical and ontological principles, but certainly
for him there is not one between metaphysical and ontologiealones:
ontology and metaphysies are interchangeable names to speak of the
system of the sentences about all the objects in general, where 'ob-
ject' always stands for I existing object'. Lesniewski does not claim
LPC to he equivalent with OPC "since they correspond to objec-
tive facts". On the contrary, they are to be kept rigorously sepa-
rated: an ontological principle is about all the objects in general,
while a logica! principle is about sentences, which are only some of
the objects. For instanee in the Critique it will be clear that the On-
tological Principle of the Excluded Middle is true, but the Logical
one is false. Lesniewski was to write that between ontological and
logical principles there is a certain kind of I correspondence', un-
fortunately not specified by Lesniewski better than it is (thanks to
this particular sharing-out of ontological/Iogical, Lesniewski could
theorize the idea of a hierarchy of languages, which in principle
41 Lesniewski [1913b], p. 322 (Engl. transl. p. 54\.
42 Cf. Wolerskî [1987], p. XX. I
43 luk ' , [1910]
, asiewicz , a , pp. 131-132 (Germ. trans!. pp. 161-162) ..> La Science et la
44 methode was first published in Polish in 1911.See also p 8 ba e!?-'
Cf.Wolenskt [1987J, pp. XXXI. . a v
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seems to be infinite, that must have played a crucial role in the
developme~to~ Ta~ski's semantic inquiries).41
. !,:s Wole~kI c1a1m~, a fundamental thing in luktlsiewicz's book
IS his ?ntolog~sm, that IS a strongly ontological view of logic thanks
to which l?gIC always has an ontological interpretation.42 It would
be ~ccordmg to this feature that OPC and LPC are said to he
e9Ul~alent, although o~e sh~uld,accept the hypothesis that Luka-
sl.ewlcz was not to believe In a true' logic. Lesni~wski's ontolo-
glS~ seems to have been stronger than Lukasiewicz's, even at that
pe:I~d, an~ to have been k~pt on that way later, since actually
Lesmewski s res~arch s~ows ltself to have always bçen the pursuit
of The True L?gIc .. The Iss~e recal1s the large place the discussion
about conv~ntlO~alzsmhas ~ the Attempt2 (see S5). Lesniewski in-
trod~ces, lus ~o~Ico-semanhc ideas by means of wha t he cal1s 'con-
ve~hons , pomtmg out careful1y that they are true sçntences about
objects created by whoever establishes them and not indemon-
strabl~ sente.nces a~out ~bjects over which on~ has po power. The
polemic agall~st Pomcare and conventionalism as a matter of fact
see~s to be .dlrected at Lukasiewicz, in accordance yr{ith whom the
ethico-practical worth of PC is similar to that of the Iaws of Euclid-
ean geometry:
Although the p~oof, of the principle of contradiction is nt0t complete, we
should not despise lt. Also for other principles we have J1lotbetter proofs.
The laws of geom~tr.i~al figures, just as the principle of co]lllltradiction, base
~hemse~ve~ on defmltI?nS, and we are right in doubting t#'le truth of them
In a~ph~ahon to real fIgures as we doubi the principle of contradiction in
~ppltcatIon ,to the real world. We do not know in fact wh/~ether the defini-
tion of Euclidean spa ce corresponds to real space nor hav,'e we guarantees
that the definition of object corresponds to realoht t.IRut since in ap-1· h 1 jee s. .P""'
P Ying t, ese aws to reality we do not meet any obstacle, we make use of
them WIthout scruple and we wiII act in this way as I ;jls we succeed in
doing it.43 ong
~t seems, ho.wever, that lukasiewicz Was not thinkin/ê at that time
h~t the choice of one or other Iogic was a matter of c~nvention(he
nelther had built a system itself of ,non-Aristotelian . logic', yet).44
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45 Lukasiewicz [1936],p. 206-207 (Engl. transl. p. 233).
46 Cf. ibid.and Lukasiewicz [1918].
47 Cf. Kotarbiriski [1967],p. 2.
48 Cf. Lesniewski [1927/31], Ch. I, p. 166 (Eng!. transl, p. 176). Kotarbinski [1966],
p. 158 might give birth to the erroneous conviction that the encounter with Lu-
kasiewicz marked a sudden turn in Lesniewski in a logico-mathematica! sense,
while Lesniewski started to master the fundamentals of the "theory of deduc-
tion" only in 1918-1919 and to operate with symbolic language only in 1920, cf.
Lesniewski [1927/31], Ch. XI, p. 154 (Eng!. transl. pp. 364-365)
49 Cf. Betti [1998a].
50 Cf. Kotarbinski [1913].
And still in 1936 he was convineed that the choice at issue de-
pended on experience.o But perhaps the accent he put on the prac-
tical worth of PC drove Lesniewski to stress his distance from con-
ventionalism, in any case. While it is easy to become aware of the
fascination the parallel - to which he was to be faithful for many
years _46 between non-Euclidean geometry and the 'new logic'
exerted on Lukasiewicz, noticed among others by Kotarbinski.e
Lesniewski is not attracted by the new logic - be it 'symbolic' or
'non-Aristotelian' - nor would. he still have been for years.
Lesniewski's efforts will always be directed to a modernized tradi-
tional logic,48 for the moment conceived in a non-symbolic lan-
guage. Lesniewski's shift to symbolic logic - which was less dra-
matic than is commonly believed to be _49 did not signify anyway
a shift to 'non-Aristotelian logic', toa. Lesniewski in this sense was
very conservative, and that sort of old-fashioned flavour his logic
emanates - entangled with remarkably modern and far-seeing
peculiarities - is due to rus faith to traditionallogic. As clear from
chapter XV of On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle, Luka-
siewicz started in 1910 to get interested in the theoretical meaning
of a system of non-Aristotelian logic, whose possibility was con-
nected, as said previously, with the dethronement of PC from the
royal chair of the Supreme Principle of Logic. One cannot evoke
such matters without remembering that 'non-aristotelian' logic is
linked not only with the debate on PC, but equally with that on the
Principle of the Excluded Middle and the Principle of Bivalence,
already noticed previously. Nevertheless, since the issue would
deserve an entire paper, which should include at least Kotarbi-
nski's contribution.ë? I will not consider it in detail. I will just reeall
some philosophical traits connected with non-bivalent logic which
51 Lukasiewicz [1920],p. 170 (Eng!. trans!. p. 88).
52 [ordan [1963],p. 8.
53 Cf. Lukasiewicz - Smolka - Lesniewski et al. [1939], pp. 235-237.
54 Cf. Lukasiewicz - Smolka - Lesniewski et al. [1939],p. 234.
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are strictly related to the points presented here. When Lukasiewicz
announced the discovery of the three-valued system of proposi-
tional calculus, he emphasized that this system "has, above all,
a theoretical significance as a first attempt to construct a system of
non-Aristotelian logic" .51 As [ordan wrote, "whether it may be
shown to have also a 'practical significance' cannot be decided
until the consequences of the principle of trivalenee are investi-
gated in their relation to empirical knowledge ( ...] The question of
the application of the trivalent system of logic, of finding a set of
objects in which the axioms of this system are satisfied, is a distinct
problem and independent of the theoretical discovery which
should be judged by itself, irrespective of its application" .S2,On this
point Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski had the opportunity of showing
in the clearest way their very different opinions. In 1938 Luka-
siewicz delivered a lecture to the Circle of Scientists in Warsaw,
"Genesis of three-valued logic" . Lesniewski took part in the dis-
cussion and rus words are the sole evidence we have of his ideas
on many-valued logics.s3 Lukasiewicz outlined the discovery of
trivalent logic saying among other things that the importance of
polyvalent logic was overcoming that of non-Euclidean geometry,
and that it showed that "non equivalent ways to speak of reality"
were possible. The fundamental idea in the birth of three-valued
logic was adding a third value to the matrix of bivalent logic, with
the proviso of finding an intuitive interpretation of it. Without this,
if there had not existed at least a shadow of possibility to interpret intui-
tively this third value, then trivalent logic would not have been born. The
author would have been accused of having had a thought devoid of
sense.v
The interpretation Lukasiewicz had in mind was linked with
Aristotle's Perihermeneias and sentences on future contingent
facts, that were in his view neither true nor false. Lesniewski
contrasted this position as strongly as he contrasted Luka-
siewicz's non-existent objects in the Aitempt-. For him the third
value had no sense, because "no one had been able until now to
give to the symbol '2' introduced in trivalent logic's matrix any
•
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55 Lukasiewicz - Smal ka - Lesniewski et al. [1939], pp. 239-240.
56 Cf. the proof against them in Lesniewski [1913b], pp. 350-352 (Eng!. trans!.
p.85).
intelligible sense, which may ground this or that 'realistic' (rze-
czywistosciowej) interpretation of this 'logic'" . Lesniewski de-
clared never to have met in science any situation such as had
required an integration of ordinary calculus of propositions that
followed from the introduetion of any third logical value in ar-
gumentations. Lesniewski was arguing that any 'intensional
function' such as, for instance, 'is possible that P' had to be 'de-
intensionalized' in order to be examined on the basis of exten-
sional and bivalent logic, since he did not know any system of
intensional logic that on his opinion was satisfactory. Luka-
siewicz's answer was particularly meaningful: he explained his
end had been to build a system of pure logic without considera-
tion for the applications it could have, although remarking his
feeling obliged of giving an intuitive interpretation of it. Finally,
Lukasiewicz disclosed the real issue of the disagreement with
Lesniewski, that is indeterminism and Principle of Causality:
If there existed in the world an omniscient man [...] he could not infer,
basing himself on the laws of nature, that tomorrow there wil! or not will
be a sea battle, if it were not conditional already now; besides, he could
not state if such a battle took place in the past, if its consequences had
notlasted till now. At that moment, thus, the sea battle passes into the
'realm of possibilities', and this is not because we do not know anything
about it, but because this is just the structure of the world.v
Here I am obliged to leave out of my account a lot of things,
Lesniewski's views on the subject included, which are chiefly
contained in his "Is Truth only Eternal or is it also Sempiternal?";
I limit myself to remark that the most important point in this re-
spect is once more an exclusively ontological controversy: for
Lesniewski there are not indeterminate sentences'é in the structure
of the world which symbolize undecided facts as future contingent
ones - which, furthermore, are not contingent at all. In Lesniewski
objects seem to be set up ab aeterno in space and in time:
it is already now true that [...] I shall choose this rather than another pro-
fession, that of two crossroads I shall take the right rather than the Ieft one,
that at a given moment a certain thought will cross my mind as sum-
RusselI, Chwistek and the Beginnings of Mereology
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moned by my attention, that at times I win give, refuse, keep or break my
word of honour.v
Lukasiewicz's opposition ontology/ metaphysics kept on remain-
ing still valid when he passed from alocal (the inquiry on logical
laws) to agiobal understanding of logic (the study of logical sys-
tems). Ontological pictures of the world vary according to the sys-
tem of logic one chooses: yet the world itself, from a metaphysical
point of view, is as it is, and in the real choice one should be
guided by experience, not by logic.58 Lesniewski's post1920 logical
systems were built with a completely different theoretical attitude:
for him there was just Our World and The True Logic, which was
just Lesniewski an, constructed on axioms which he believed
firmly to be true, although being uncapable to explain why it was
he believed SO.59
Lesniewski was right in ascribing to On the Principle of Contradic-
tion in Aristotle an importance that largely overcame his declared
dislike for Lukasiewicz's positions. In fact the work did not cause
a sudden shift of rus thought, but left a Iong-Iasting mark in the
development of his ideas: he met RusselI's antinomy of the class of
the classes which are not subordinated to themselves for the first
time in Lukasiewicz's book. Everyone who knows even very little
about Lesniewski is aware that Mereology was born in conse-
quence of the attempt of solving the antinomies of set theory. But
maybe few know the whole story, which starts with the Attemptï.
As already seen, Russell's antinomy was regarded by Lukasiewicz
as a contradictory object, but Lesniewski at that time was deeply
convineed that there were not such objects, and probably was not
really interested in RusselI's antinomy until he actually tried to
analyze it. Lesniewski wrote his paper on Russell's antinomy, "Is
the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves Subordinated
to ltself?" (1914) after the Critique. The latter criticizes the logical
57 Lesniewski [1913a], pp. 514-515 (Engl, trans!. p. 103, reproduced with slight
changes).
58 Cf.[ordan [1963], p. 9.
59 Cf. Lesniewski [1916], pp. 5-7.
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principle of excluded middle on the basis of the convention which
he called 'The Restricted Principle of the Excluded Middle', i. e.
RTND A sentence with denotative subject and connotative predi-
cate is true if and only if its singular contradictory is false,
60 See for instanee Chwistek [1912], p. 16 [283], n. 3 and Lesniewski [1913b], p. 330
n. 26 (Eng!. trans!. p. 63 n. 26).
61 Lesniewski's discussion on the artificial nature of scientific language connected
to that restrietion is quite outstanding, and important both for the development
of Lesniewski's logic and of Tarski's semantic ideas, cf. Lesniewski [1913b], pp.
343-349 (Eng!. transl, pp. 77-82) and Betti (2004).
267Lukasiewicz and Lesniewski on Contradiction
62 Cf. Lesniewski [1927/31], Ch. II, pp. 185-186 (Eng!. trans!. p. 201).
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expression required to specify which kind of object was understood
by 'class'. And that was the birth of Mereology. SA Lukasiewicz
was an important souree for Lesniewski'sapproach to formal
logic, but one should also consider the importance Chwistek's pa-
per had in this respect, and first of all one should not despise the
idea that it was Lesniewski's conviction that there were not con-
tradictory objects in the one world there was that gave rise to
Mereology.sê
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which was already elaborated in the Attempt-. In the Critique
Lesniewski quotes a paper by Leon Chwistek, "The principle of
contradiction in the light of Bertrand RusselI's more recent inquir-
ies" (1912), and, indeed, in the Critique seems to take most of the
materials from Chwistek's paper as a starting point of his analysis.
The important issue for the present ends in the Critique is the
treatment of sentences with empty subjects: given Lesniewski's
theory of truth from which RTND sterns, antinomies like Nelson-
Grelling's or Meinong's Paradox could be solved simply by
showing that the sentences which contradiet themselves are both
false, that means by showing that their subjects are empty.
Lesniewski considers a series of antinomies which not only are
exactly the antinomies Chwistek presents in his paper, of which
the last and the most important is RusselI's one, but even the pages
. of the works quoted by Lesniewski are the same quoted by
Chwistek.w Although there would be a lot of important things to
notice about the remarkably pioneering solution of Epimenides'
Paradox, I should notice only that Lesniewski solved it more or
Iess in a similar way, putting in addition arestriction to connota-
tive self-referential names.e! WeIl, the impression one has in read-
ing Lesniewski's Class of Classes is that it is actually the last chapter
of the Critique published separately. Lesniewski's approach to Rus-
seII's Antinomy is the same as all the others solved in the Critique:
he tried to show that the Antinomy was based on sentences with
empty subjects. The brand new fact was that in this case it was not
enough to restrict the expressive power of language, as in the solu-
tion of Epimenides' paradox, though very brilliant. Ta show that
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